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The world changed after 9/11, and so did the US banking regulations.  One change 
was that it has become increasingly difficult for families and communities in Somalia to 
receive remittances from relatives and friends living in the United States.  Those funds are 
essential to the livelihoods of 40% of the population, especially women and children. It 
further has a negative impact on the national economy of one of the world’s poorest 
countries.  However, US banks has become increasingly willing to assume the costs of 
complying with the government’s Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of 
Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations or to risk the penalties for failing to meet those 
regulations.  The problem grew to crisis levels in 2011, as the country was experiencing a 
devastating drought. At that point, Oxfam America, responding to requests from its local 
development partners, agreed to use its well-developed policy research and advocacy 
capacity in an effort to resolve the problem.  This case study documents, evaluates and 
draws lessons from the first three years of Oxfam’s ongoing campaign on remittances into 











In the midst of World War II, 1942, and in response to the plight of refugees in 
Greece, a group of Quaker intellectuals, social activists, and Oxford academics formed the 
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, which later became known as Oxfam (from the words 
Oxford and Famine.) Oxfam America (OUS) was founded in 1970 in Washington, DC by a 
group of volunteers in response to the crisis in Bangladesh with a loan from Oxfam Great 
Britain. OUS relocated to Boston 1973 (Inside Oxfam America, 2015).  
Oxfam America is a humanitarian and development International Non-
Governmental Organization (INGO) that strives to find lasting solutions to hunger, poverty, 
and injustice. OUS is part of the 17 Oxfam confederation affiliates.  Oxfam America 
envisions a just world without poverty, as they believe that poverty is solvable. OUS 
believes that the best approach is to look for the conditions that cause poverty. OUS’s work 
falls into four main categories: saving lives, overcoming poverty and injustice, campaigning 
for social justice, and promoting public (Inside Oxfam America, 2015). This approach has 
allowed OUS to achieve a global reach and build a positive public image. 
For many years, Oxfam has been campaigning and advocating to raise and amplify 
the voices of the voiceless. The Worldwide Influencing Network (WIN) is a new Oxfam 
strategic plan that aims at reallocating resources towards country teams to do more policy 
advocacy work, since they have primary legitimacy in their own countries to do so. It is 
hoped that WIN becomes a more holistic influencing model focused on the power, 
attitudes, and beliefs that underlie poverty and injustice. Thus, in its new Strategic Plan, 
National Influencing Guidelines (2013) by Oxfam International indicates: 
By 2020, Oxfam will have contributed to achieve more profound and lasting change 
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in the lives of people living with poverty and injustice. We will have done this at a 
far greater scale by creating a world-wide influencing network (WIN) of One 
Program teams, united by a common vision for change, adequately resourced, able 
to use the full range of influencing techniques at their disposal, and actively 
participating in a wider movement to fight against the injustice of poverty. (p. 6) 
 
There are three approved priorities for the first phase of WIN by Oxfam’s Executive 
Directors (EDs): 
1. Achieving a giant leap forward in national-level influencing in the South; 
2. Strengthening people’s voices and mobilising for impact in the digital age; 
3. Strengthening Oxfam’s position as a thought leader (National Influencing 
Guidelines, 2013, p. 7). 
 
This in-depth case study was initiated for OUS Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning 
(MEL) Team that supports the WIN strategy.  The research was conducted during my six-
month fellowship as a Policy Influence Evaluation Fellow in that Team, from September 
2014 to February 2015. WIN documents campaigns primarily for internal use as well as 
publishes some of them for the wider audience. This in-depth case study was based on a 
protocol designed in collaboration with SIT Graduate Institute Professor Jeff Unsicker. 
During my fellowship, I wrote five short case studies. They capture a synopsis of the 
campaigns, including a clear picture of the campaign’s goals, methods, results, and lessons 
learned. The lessons are shared with the campaign team and other campaigning teams to 
reflect upon and utilize. In fact, it is this process of reflection and learning that fulfill the 
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‘learning’ component of the MEL.  
As I have observed, there is an increased effort within WIN to bolster the advocacy 
capacity of country teams that tend to involve influencing International/US policies. This 
in-depth case study is an example of how local organizations can engage Oxfam when it is 
necessary to influence international/US policies that are impacting people’s lives.  At other 
times, it specifically focuses on the country level, with little to no involvement of 
international/US policies. For instance, as part of the global GROW campaign, I wrote two 
case studies—one on Cambodia and the other on Colombia— targeted at corporations’ 
practices that impact poor people’s lives. Cargill, Land and Power in Colombia (see 
appendices) is a case where three Oxfam affiliates worked with Colombia’s country team 
and other local organizations to stop a bill the Colombian government was preparing to 
present to the Congress. The bill was designed to facilitate and legalize large-scale 
concentration of land intended for small farmers.  
Methodology 
This case study is based on a research protocol prepared in collaboration between 
Oxfam America and SIT Graduate Institute that sets out guidelines for conducting in-depth 
case studies on influencing work. It is intended to support the documentation of 
influencing work conducted by Oxfam staff in-country and in the United States in support 
of country priorities. Basically, case studies aim to provide a learning process to support 
Oxfam’s ambition to build a Worldwide Influencing Network (WIN). This case study is 
based on semi-structured interviews conducted with the Somalia Remittance/ 
Humanitarian team who worked in the campaign and other stakeholders including the 
Policy Advisor, Campaign Manager, Communication Staff, Coordinators, Congressman Staff 
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and Somali diaspora representatives. The interviews took place in January 2015, and they 
were conducted via phone, Skype, and in person with some follow-up questions via email. 
The case study also draws on secondary resources and internal documents provided by the 
Campaign Team. The protocol has 13 sections (see appendices). Due to the unavailability of 
any official M&E for the campaign, the paper will briefly discuss M&E as per Oxfam National 
Influencing Guidelines. One of these sections, Impact, is beyond the scope of this paper. On 
the other hand, Effectiveness, Outcomes and Contribution will be discussed jointly in one 
heading.  
The process of writing case studies is straightforward. Data is collected from 
existing documents about the campaign. Those documents were given to me along with a 
cover page—a paragraph describing the campaign, key documents, and key people to 
interview if needed. In some cases, interviews were conducted, especially for this case, and 
on other cases internal documents and/or a longer case study were sufficient. In all cases, 
however, Senior Campaigns Coordinator and Campaign Manager revise the document and 
add or edit some of the information. After I go over those edits, I will send it back for a final 
approval and then send it to the Senior Campaigns Coordinator to post it on Padare, OUS’s 
internal website. For the Somalia Remittances case, OUS Policy & Campaign Evaluation 
Manager, and Sustainable Development Chair at SIT Graduate Institute, revised the drafts 
(see appendices). 
When I started reading and drafting Somalia Remittances case, I felt very connected 
with the issue and the campaign as a whole as a Yemeni. First, Yemen has a sea border with 
Somalia, and both countries have many cultural and traditional commonalities. Many 
Yemeni tribes migrated to Somalia and formed communities there long time ago. During 
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the Somali Civil War, a great number Somalis sought refuge in Yemen. But above all, putting 
Yemeni-Americans in the shoes of Somali-Americans who are unable to support their 
families in Yemen financially made me feel devastated. I decided to know more about this 
remittances campaign, and so I discussed it with my fellowship supervisor at OUS and my 
academic advisor at SIT. We agreed to pilot-test the in-depth case study protocol on the 
same campaign. I wrote the Terms of Reference and identified key individuals to interview 
in January 2015. I conducted all the eight interviews and wrote the first three of the 13 
sections of the protocol from January to February 2015.  I went back to school but 
continued writing the case in the Course-Linked Capstone category as a partial fulfillment 
of my MA degree in Sustainable Development from SIT Graduate Institute.  
Context 
The Republic of Somalia is one of the countries of the Horn of Africa. It is bordered 
to the north by the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti to the northwest, to west by Ethiopia, the Indian 
Ocean to the east and Kenya to the southwest. It occupies a total area of 637, 657 sq. km, 
almost five times the size of Alabama; slightly smaller than Texas. The population comes to 
10 million in 2014 with total GDP of US$ 5.8 billion, US$ 600 per capita. Muslims constitute 
about 99.8% of the population, the majority of whom belong to the Sunni branch of Islam 
(The World FactBook, 2015). Somali and Arabic are the official languages spoken in 
Somalia.  
The Civil War that broke out in 1990 and the subsequent violent conflicts led to the 
state being classified as a failed state with no functional government since 1991. This war 
also ensued the flourishing of extremist groups such as Al-Shabab. The current form of 
government is federal parliamentary republic. 
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The first Somalis to arrive in the United States were sailors who came in the 1920s 
and settled in New York. The largest immigration to the US from Somalia, and to other 
countries, was during the 1990 Somali Civil War. Estimates of the Somali diaspora in the US 
according to the World Bank data is 100 thousand, concentrated in Minnesota, Ohio, New 
York, Washington states. According to Global Migrant Origin Database, the number of 
remittance senders from the US is 56,286 who approximately between remit $200 - $400 
million annually into Somalia, an amount comparable to US development and humanitarian 
aid to the country ($242 million) in 2012 (as cited in Orozco and Yansura, 2013, p. 9).   
During the drought and food crisis of 2011 in Somalia, the worldwide Somali 
diaspora played a key role in helping their families survive through remittances.  Somalis 
around the world remit about $1.3 billion dollars a year into Somalia, an average amount 
that exceeds the total world humanitarian assistance in 2012 (861 million) "a year in which 
donors provided Somalia with an unusually high amount of money to aid recovery from the 
2011 drought” (Orozco and Yansura, 2013, p. 10). Remittances are not only important to 
the improvement of the Somali wellbeing, but also crucial to lifting the Somali economy 
since it is the "largest or second largest economy after telecommunication" (OUS Senior 
Humanitarian Advisor, Personal Communication, January 2015). Somaliland officials told 
Oxfam that remittances constitute 25-40 percent of its GDP (Orozco and Yansura, 2013). 
Hence, the continuation of remittances into Somalia is essential to recover from the 
protracted humanitarian, economic, and political crises.  
Account closures began to affect Somali-American MTOs as early as 1990 and spiked 
in the years following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. While 
there are legitimate security concerns that money transfers could support violent and 
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extremist groups in Somalia, there is strong evidence these remittances allow Somali 
civilian recipients to spend them based on their needs and priorities, such as food, shelter, 
healthcare, sending children to school, setting up small businesses, and investing in 
communities.  Remittances to women, in particular, result in investments in education, 
health, and nutrition. These funds further support community resilience, prevent violent 
extremism, and reduce the need for international humanitarian assistance.  The remittance 
system also plays an essential part in funding humanitarian operations in Somalia, which 
use remittances to their in-country teams for operational costs such as staff salaries and 
program costs, i.e. cash transfers and cash for work programs.  
Somali-American money transfer operators (MTOs) play a central role in the 
remittance process, providing the service of transferring cash from the US diaspora to 
recipients throughout Somalia. Somali-American MTOs require US bank accounts to 
facilitate transfers. Somali-American MTOs have invested in compliance systems, policies, 
and training to adhere to US Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism (CFT) regulations. Nevertheless, US banks have branded Somalia as a high-
risky destination and have closed MTOs’ bank accounts at twice the rate of closures of Latin 
American MTO accounts, without providing specific justifications.   
The Advocates 
1. Oxfam America (OUS) 
Oxfam America (OUS) is a global organization working to right the wrongs of 
poverty, hunger, and injustice. OUS is one of 17 members of the international Oxfam 
confederation, which works with people in more than 90 countries to create lasting 
solutions. OUS's vision is "a just world without poverty"(Oxfam America, 2015). OUS is one 
SOMALIA MONEY REMITTANCES 
 
13
of the few INGOs that have a hybrid model to development. That is, it not only seeks to 
solve poverty through program implementation, but also researches reasons that 
perpetuate poverty and designs campaigns to influence decision makers, including 
government officials and the private sector. OUS has a long history of advocacy and 
influencing work in the US and abroad.  OUS’s influencing work spans from climate change, 
food, agriculture, livelihood, aid effectiveness, private sector engagement, resilience, active 
citizens and accountable states, disaster & conflict, gender justice, to resource rights and 
trade.  
OUS is a well-established humanitarian INGO that works in both development 
programs and policy advocacy. It has a great capacity and well-qualified staff. OUS has 
approximately 450 staff of whom around 100 work in Policy and Campaigns division, 225 
in Programs division, 35 in Executive office and operations (HR/IT/Finance) division and 
90 in Communications and Fundraising division. (OUS Global Staffing and HR Operations 
Manager) 
Oxfam has worked with local Somali organizations to implement projects on the 
ground in Somalia for 40 years. With 4 million people in crisis during the drought in 2011, 
Oxfam worked through local partners to provide water and sanitation, emergency food 
security and livelihoods, and nutrition interventions to hundreds of thousands of people 
affected by conflict and drought. Through local partners Oxfam has assisted over 1.5 
million people in Somalia with some form of assistance since the food crisis response 
started on July 1, 2011 (East Africa food crisis Oxfam’s response in Somalia until Dec. 16, 
2011).  
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This strong relationship and trust that Oxfam has built with local organizations 
encouraged local partners to ask OUS to get involved when those organizations were 
alarmed by the closures of Money Transfer Operators by US banks. OUS began its work on 
remittances to Somalia in December 2011 to prevent the potential threat this remittance 
cut-off poses on the livelihood of the Somali families.  
The initial exploration of the issue and trips within the US and Somalia by OUS 
Policy Advisor along with further conversion with Degan Ali, Adeso chair, who expressed 
her concern about the accounts closures and emphasized the importance of remittances to 
Somalia, made it clear that OUS has to get involved in the issue. At this point, the 
humanitarian team decided to fund research and Adeso agreed to participate in the 
research to gain a comprehensive picture of the remittance issue and possible solutions 
culminating in the research report Keeping the Lifeline Open in June 2013. The research was 
conducted by the Inter-American Dialogue and co-branded by OUS and Adeso. The report 
gives a clear overview of how Somalia remittances work and outlines clear 
recommendations to banks, US policy makers, MTOs, US government officials, and Somali 
authorities in order to ensure the continued flow of remittances to Somalia while 
addressing genuine security concerns.  
It is important to note that Oxfam is currently the only US-based humanitarian 
organization actively working on remittances within the US.  Although CARE and World 
Vision have worked on remittances in Somalia and in the UK, only Oxfam America works on 
remittances in the US. Oxfam contributes policy expertise and plays a convening role 
between the US and Somali government officials, the private sector, and the Somali 
diaspora.   
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2. African Development Solutions (Adeso) 
Adeso is a humanitarian and development NGO with a long history of working in 
Somalia. Originally founded by Fatima Jibrel in 1991 as the Horn of Africa Relief and 
Development Organization in Connecticut, USA, Adeso has a bottom-up approach to 
development in Africa and they envision " an Africa that is not dependent on aid, but on the 
resourcefulness and capabilities of its people" (Adeso, n.d.).  Adeso is well-placed to fulfill 
this vision as an insider African organization with credibility and strong bonds with African 
communities. Adeso has been working with African communities for over 20 years to 
improve the community's wellbeing in such areas as the environment, society and finance. 
Adeso's work can be broken down into four areas, which are “a) Developing skills for life 
and work, b) Providing humanitarian aid, c) Reinvigorating the economy and d) Influencing 
policy” (Adeso, n.d.).   
Policy 
Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) play a central role in the remittance chain. The 
system is centralized and falls under two groups:   
The first group of agents work exclusively for one MTO as salaried staff and/or receive 
some commission based on the volume of transactions they handle. The second group is 
composed of independent agents who have contractual relationships with one or more 
MTOs and who are responsible for their own operating costs.  According to interviews with 
MTO agents and executives in Somalia, most agents work exclusively for one MTO. (Orozco 
and Yansura, 2013, p. 13) 
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Based on interviews conducted for the report, Somali-American MTOs focus on 
building trust and relationships, and both agents and customers identified trust as the key 
to successful money transfer business in Somalia. According to a Somali Imam, “mutual 
trust is an essential component of Islamic law, and, by extension, of Islamic financial 
services” (Orozco and Yansura, 2013, p. 13). 
MTO executives also noted that Islamic law 
and reputational concerns require that MTOs 
avoid doing business with known criminals. 
As one agent in Somalia explained: 
Our reputation is at the core of our 
business success; our ability to attract 
good employees and customers is 
dependent on our reputation 
remaining intact. Even if we do 
everything else right [but] through a 
single mistake allow a customer to 
undertake illegal transactions … 
through our branch, we will not only 
risk our lives but also our reputation 
could be irreparably damaged.  
(Orozco and Yansura, 2013, p. 13) see 
box 1 for a step-by-step of MTOs 
remittance process. 
Box 1: 
1. MTOs receive the money from the sender (a 
member of the diaspora), their contact info and a 
valid ID, cash they want to remit, receive 
commission, and gets details about the recipient.  
2. The agent screens the names of the sender 
and the recipient through the Specially Designated 
Nationals (SDN) List, the US Treasury Department 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) roster of 
individuals and entities subject to 
counterterrorism and other sanctions; if the check 
returns no results, the transaction can proceed.  
3. The agent submits the transaction by 
updating the amount, the sender’s and the 
recipient’s details, and instructions as to where to 
deliver the funds to a clearinghouse, usually at the 
MTO headquarters. Submission is generally done 
electronically.  
4. The clearinghouse reviews and confirms that 
proper due diligence has been followed and, if 
satisfied, approves the transaction. The details 
immediately appear on an online database so that 
the sending agent, the headquarters, and the 
paying agent can all see the transaction. If the 
clearinghouse is not satisfied, it suspends the 
transaction and asks the sending agent to provide 
additional information.  
5. The receiving agent then deposits the cash in 
a local bank account to be transferred to the 
company bank account.  
6. The paying agent views the transaction 
information and notifies the recipient either by 
telephone or by text message.  
7. The recipient goes to the nearest branch, 
provides his or her details, proof of identity, and 
the name and the location of the sender.  
8. The paying agent confirms the details given 
against the transaction records in the database. If 
the details match and the receiver’s identity is 
confirmed, the agent generates a receipt from the 
system. Once the recipient signs the receipt, the 
agent pays the money and the system 
automatically informs the sender (usually by text 
message) that the money has been paid to the 
recipient. The transaction is completed. (Orozco 
and Yansura, 2013, p. 12) 
SOMALIA MONEY REMITTANCES 
 
17
Somali-American MTO account closures have undermined the US-based Somali diaspora’s 
confidence in the US government and financial sector and have endangered the lives and 
livelihoods of Somalis.  To avoid the adverse consequences of further account closings, the 
Somali authorities, the US government, banks, and MTOs need to find a solution to allow 
remittances from the US to Somalia to continue (Orozco and Yansura, 2013).  
a. The Problem 
Somali-American MTOs require US bank accounts to operate. They have invested in 
compliance systems and training to adhere to US anti-money laundering regulations. 
Nevertheless, US banks claim that Somalia is a high-risk destination for remittances and 
have closed MTOs’ bank accounts without providing specific justifications at twice the rate 
of closures of Latin American MTO accounts. Account closures began to affect Somali-
American MTOs as early as 1990 and spiked in 2001 onwards. These closures have 
disrupted an economic lifeline to Somalia, hindered business growth, encouraged 
informality among remittance senders, and strained relations between the Somali-
American community and US officials (Orozco and Yansura, 2013). MTO bank account 
closures had been a common practice in the US, UK and Australia in a precautionary 
measure to respond to the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combatting the Financing of 
Terrorism (CFT) regulations.  From a financial inclusion standpoint, many believe this is a 
step in a very devastating direction. 
At the beginning when OUS started to get involved in the remittance issues, there 
was a feeling that some banks are discriminating against Somalia, and that is why there 
were suggestions of campaigning against those banks. But as the Keeping the Lifeline Open 
report was released, the campaign team understood that it is not discrimination on the part 
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of banks, but rather it is a US government problem that unfolds clearly into two reasons 
articulated by Senior Humanitarian Advisor in: a) “A broad trend in the banking sector 
called de-risking due to certain drivers such as the financial crisis and consolidation of 
banks.” b) “High penalties on banks that violate US money-laundering regulations 
compared to the low revenue banks generate from.”  (OUS Senior Humanitarian Advisor, 
Personal Communication, January 2015). So it is 
both reputational and legal risk. 
OUS commissioned research to gain a 
comprehensive picture of the remittance issue and 
possible solutions culminating in the research 
report “Keeping the Lifeline Open” in June 2013, 
which was co-branded with Adeso and Inter-
American Dialogue (which conducted the 
research). The report gives a clear overview of 
Somalia remittances and outlines clear recommendations to banks, US policy makers, 
MTOs, US government officials, and Somali authorities to ensure the continued flow of 
remittances to Somalia while addressing genuine security concerns (See box 2). 
Recommendations from the Report 
(box 2): 
 
1. [US] Banks should expand services 
to Somali-American MTOs. 
2. US policymakers should prioritize 
remittance to Somalia. 
3. The us treasury department should help 
integrate Somali-American MTOs into an 
automated clearinghouse (ACH) 
4. MTOs should improve training 
and monitoring of agents 
5. MTOs and regulators should 
collaborate on best practices 
6. MTOs should develop mobile money 
transfer technology for Somalia 
7. The us government should help 
Somalia regulate its payment systems 
8. Somali authorities should actively 
regulate international money transfers 
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  There was a bill introduced by 
Congressman Ellison (Rep. D. MN) and OUS's 
supported the passage of this bill.  When 
Ellison’s bill started moving in Congress, 
Congressman Adam Smith (Rep. D. WA) got 
interested and wanted to learn more about 
the issue. OUS was able to work with Smith’s staff and convinced them to work with 
Congressman Ellison’s bill and Congressman Smith became a co-sponsor of the bill which 
helped push the bill through Congress and House on the summer and was signed into law 
by President Obama on August of 2014 as the Money Remittances Improvement Act (see 
box 3 for the bill highlights and appendices for the original bill). 
The bill streamlines the remittances process by "allow[ing] the Treasury secretary 
to use state examinations for certain financial institutions instead of federal reporting 
requirements" (Marcos, 2014). The bill is also supposed to make it easier for nonbank 
financial institutions such as Money Service Businesses (MSBs) to provide remittance 
payments internationally. The bill reduces the regulatory burden on MSBs and US banks 
dealing with them, which have come under a tight scrutiny of the US government. 
Therefore, state examiners can focus on the most problematic cases or MTOs instead of 
being spread thin, looking at the whole sector. As OUS Senior Humanitarian Advisor puts it, 
“By focusing on the real problems, the system becomes more secure, which, in theory, 
makes it more bankable” (OUS Senior Humanitarian Advisor, Personal Communication, 
January 2015). Although OUS supported the passage of the bill, it regarded it as a modest 
proposal with no guarantees that it would make a difference in strengthening access to 
Money Remittances Improvement Act of 
2014 explained (box 3): 
 
A bill that passed in the United States House of 
Representatives during the 113th United States 
Congress. The bill would "allow the Treasury 
secretary to use state examinations for certain 
financial institutions instead of federal 
reporting requirements." The bill would make 
it easier for nonbank financial institutions such 
as money service businesses to provide 
payments internationally.  
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banking services for Somali-American MTOs.  OUS Senior Humanitarian Advisor describes 
the primary significance of the bill as “ a symbolic gesture by Congress in support of 
banking for MTOs” (Personal Communication, January 2015). 
For a period leading up to January 2015, Somali MTOs have been heavily reliant on a 
single bank, Merchants Bank of California, to transfer between 60 to 80 percent of the total 
remittances sent to Somalia from the U.S. (Welsh, 2015). Although OUS succeeded in 
preventing Merchants from closing accounts in the summer of 2014, as originally 
scheduled, due to pressure from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
Merchants Bank announced that it would terminate all of its Somali MTO accounts on 
February 6, 2015. Consequently, many Somali MTOs, including the largest by volume and 
coverage, were planning to discontinue money transfers if the account closures move 
forward as planned. While it is difficult to assess how much money Somali-Americans will 
be able to send following the account closures, between $200m-$400m/year could be at 
stake (Orozco and Yansura, 2013).  MTOs could manage to continue their business based 
on, for example in the UK, a wholesale MTOs who have existing accounts that MTOs with no 
accounts can transfer money through. This is a vulnerable process as banks can still 
pressure those wholesale MTOs to end business with MTOs with no accounts. Other means 
leave diaspora with illegal channels of transfer with no official oversight, usually costly and 
put the sender’s (diaspora) money at risk of fraud. 
b. Policy Change Goals 
There were a number of policy alternatives and solutions discussed and pushed by 
OUS in the campaign and campaign spikes. The proposed solutions included mending 
current banking regulations. OUS was also discussing the possibility of the New York 
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Federal Reserve Bank to open accounts for MTOs to maintain the flow of remittances. OUS 
message to the Department of Treasury and US Department of State was to ensure that 
Somali Americans are able to continue to support their families in Somalia. 
US Department of State and US Department of Treasury have been also working 
with the Somali Central Bank to strengthen its financial system to be able to integrate it in 
the international financial network. This is one of the campaign’s long-term goals that, if 
fulfilled, would reduce reliance on remittance and strengthen the remittance system. 
OUS further decided to influence Merchants bank to reverse their decision to close 
Somali-American MTO bank accounts. The purpose was to win time to continue its 
campaign so that the government can take more serious actions to solve the issue of 
remittances once and for all. 
The Politics 
Ingrained within the first Amendment to the US constitution, Freedom of Speech and 
Expression is protected by law. Thus, NGOs such as Oxfam America have the power and 
latitude to advocate and influence legislations and regulations of the US government. OUS 
advocates and influence US government on a number of issues. On this issue, OUS has 
identified at least three targets for its campaign and subsequent campaign spike. OUS 
aimed to influence the Department of Treasury to ensure legal and secure channels for the 
Somali diaspora to remit money to their families in Somalia. OUS also supported the 
introduction and passage of the Money Remittances Improvement Act in the House and 
Senate as well as attempted to influence the private sector represented in Merchants Bank 
to delay their decision to close MTO bank accounts. Since WIN attempts to build the 
capacity of national influencing teams and many, like myself, are not U.S. politically savvy, 
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the following section describes the institutions the campaign targeted to make easier to 
understand the politics involved in the campaign. 
 
This paragraph was removed for confidentiality consideration. 
The US Treasury Department is the executive agency responsible for promoting 
economic prosperity and ensuring the financial security of the United States (U.S. 
Department of The Treasury, 2011). The mission of the Treasury Department is to: 
Maintain a strong economy and create economic and job opportunities by promoting the 
conditions that enable economic growth and stability at home and abroad, strengthen 
national security by combating threats and protecting the integrity of the financial system, 
and manage the U.S. Government’s finances and resources effectively. (U.S. Department of 
The Treasury, 2011) 
US Banking regulations are fragmented. These regulations fall under the supervision 
of at least three institutions within the Treasury: the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC). They are also subject to the State rules where these banks are located. The 
main issue that US banks have with MTOs is that US banking regulations require banks to 
comply with AML and CFT regulations. Huge fines are imposed on banks that violate these 
laws. Since Somalia is viewed as a risky destination, banks avoid dealing with Somali-
American MTOs. It’s a simple cost-benefit analysis. Since working with remittances and 
MTOs doesn't generate as much revenue as other transactions, and the penalties are 
greater than the profits, banks choose to 'de-risk' or avoid dealing with Somali MTOs 
altogether. The laws that the Department of Treasury states for transparency in the words 
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of David Cohen, Under Secretary of the Treasury of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 
are: 
At its core, financial transparency requires financial institutions to implement 
certain basic controls:  
• they must know who their customers are;  
• they must understand their customers’ normal and expected transactions;  
• and they must keep the records and make the reports necessary for 
regulators and law enforcement to take action to hold accountable those who 
abuse the financial system. (Cohen, 2014). 
  
The State Department is the equivalent of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in many 
countries. The Department's mission is to: 
Shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster 
conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and 
people everywhere. This mission is shared with the USAID, ensuring we have a 
common path forward in partnership as we invest in the shared security and 
prosperity that will ultimately better prepare us for the challenges of tomorrow. 
(U.S. Department of State, 2014) 
  
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the leading US 
government agency that works to " end extreme global poverty and enable resilient, 
democratic societies to realize their potential" (USAID, 2014). President John F. Kennedy 
created USAID in 1961. Using less than 1 percent of the total federal budget, USAID works 
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in over 100 countries on various areas such as economic prosperity, democracy and good 
governance, human rights, global health, food security and agriculture, and education to 
mention a few (USAID, 2014). What OUS aimed to achieve with the State Department and 
USAID is that they work—to fulfill their mission—with the Somali government to bolster 
their financial institutions, chiefly Somali Central Bank so as to be part of the global 
financial network and be able to manage remittances from and outside of Somalia.  
There are three branches of the United States federal government: Congress, the 
legislative branch, the President, the executive branch, and the Supreme Court, or the 
judicial branch. Congress is responsible for passing laws and is divided into two chambers: 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. The number of representatives in the house 
varies vis-à-vis the number of population in that state. If a state has a large population, 
there will be more representatives in the house. However, only two senators are elected for 
each state to represent the people in the Senate. Of the three main branches of the US 
federal government, Congress is the only branch directly elected by the American people. 
Members of the US House of Representatives are elected every two years by the people of 
that State. Senators used to be appointed by state legislatures. Under public pressure, the 
17th amendment to article that was added to the US constitution in 1913 that gave the 
people the right to elect their Senators. Due to the dependence of both Representatives and 
Senators on voters, they become largely accountable to them. Each representative 
represents the people of a single constituency, or district.  
There are at least 109, 000 Somalis in the United States (World Bank as cited in 
Keeping the Lifeline open). The heaviest concentrations are found in the Twin Cities 
(Minneapolis and Saint Paul) in Minnesota, followed by Washington, DC; Columbus, Ohio; 
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New York City; Buffalo, New York; Kansas City; San Diego; San Francisco; Seattle metro 
areas (Somali community in US: Demographics, n.d.). Since most of the diaspora are 
American citizens and have the power of voting, Congressmen are accountable to their 
needs and demands. It goes without saying that most of the Somali diaspora would be 
considerably impacted should remittances be entirely discontinued and would find 
themselves unable to support their families back home.  Thus, Representative Keith Ellison 
(D-MN) from district seven in Minneapolis, MN, where the majority of Somali diaspora 
resides, introduced a bill to the Congress that would become the Money Remittances 
Improvement Act of 2014. Soon, another Representative, Smith (D-WA), from Washington, 
where another Somali majority resides, co-sponsored the bill and helped push it through 
the Senate and the House.  
The campaign work had no direct opponents to its tasks. Resistance to granting OUS’s 
asks was obvious on the part of Department of Treasury to make urgent steps for more 
time was needed to painstakingly analyze the risks associated with any of the policy 
alternatives. This resistance stems from the Treasury’s concern of taking any solution that 
may facilitate laundering money and financing of terrorism. US banks also resisted keeping 
the accounts open for MTOs based off their fear of violating AML/CFT regulations. 
Strategy 
When OUS was requested to work on the remittances issue by Somali partner 
organizations, OUS tasked its Senior Humanitarian Policy Advisor, Scott Paul, with 
exploring the possibilities to get involved in the issue. Scott Paul travelled to Minnesota in 
May 2012 and Somaliland the following August to explore the root causes of the problem 
and potential for Oxfam involvement. OUS then commissioned further research to gain a 
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comprehensive picture of the remittance issue and possible solutions culminating in the 
research report ‘Keeping the Lifeline Open’ in June 2013. The research report was co-
branded with Adeso and Inter-American Dialogue, the organization that conducted the 
research. The Inter-American Dialogue was chosen mainly as their senior fellow Manuel 
Orozco, a well-respected researcher by US banks, the World Bank and on Capitol Hill, has 
conducted extensive research, policy analysis and advocacy on issues relating to global 
flows of remittances, and migration and development worldwide. OUS believed that having 
a specialist conduct the research brings credibility to the content and findings. The 
research aimed at providing evidence to how remittances are crucial for Somali life, 
livelihood, and Somali economy and made clear recommendations for US government, 
agencies, private banks, and MTOs.  
The report release was accompanied by launch events in Washington, DC, Seattle, 
Minneapolis, Nairobi and the UK. Approximately 60 people attended OUS’s report launch 
event in the Rayburn House Office Building in DC. Scott Paul spoke with researcher Manuel 
Orozco and Representative Keith Ellison (D-MN) on a panel moderated by OUS board 
member and former NPR Correspondent Anne Garrels. The audience included foreign 
affairs and financial services staff, USAID and State Department officials, and members of 
the Intelligence Community; roughly half of the audience members appeared to be junior-
level staff or interns (WIN Case Study, Somalia Remittances, 2014). The report was widely 
distributed. According to the same WIN case study, OUS distributed 600 report copies and 
Adeso few hundred and via email, including to key targets, including government officials, 
State Department and USAID officers. (WIN Case Study, Somalia Remittances, 2014),  
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The Remittance work had three main objectives. Each one was advanced through different 
strategies and specific tactics.  
i. Passage of the Money Remittances Improvement Act.  
OUS tactics include convening events, diaspora led events, round tables, and media 
work. Senior Humanitarian Advisor wrote four remittance blogs on Oxfam’s blog page, 
which had a combined 908 unique page views and 360 shares during this period. Oxfam 
also hosted one event in Seattle and spoke at two events in Minneapolis that were attended 
by members of the Somali Diaspora, congressional staffers, Somali imams and community 
leaders.  
When Representative Ellison (D-MN), who represents a district where the largest 
Somali diaspora in the US reside, was introducing the bill in the Spring of 2014, OUS 
worked in his district to mobilize the diaspora to create a positive incentive for him to 
continue to lead on the issue. OUS further wrote a letter of support to Rep. Ellison 
regarding the bill, (see picture and appendices.) Oxfam collaborated with the Somali Youth 
and Family Club, directed by Hamdi Abdulle, a community organizer, to host the first event, 
a round table, in Seattle. The round table was attended by diaspora members, money 
service representatives and also engaged elected officials such as the mayor of Seattle who 
sent one of his advisors, Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA), representative of a district where the 
majority of the Somali diaspora lives in Washington State, who also sent one of his staffers.  
Senior Humanitarian Advisor presented the findings from the Keeping the Lifeline Open 
report to the audience. This resulted in further communication with Rep Smith office and 
when Ellison’s bill started moving in Congress, Rep. Smith was interested and wanted to 
learn more about the issue.  OUS was able to convince Rep. Smith’s staff to hold a round 
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table of multiple stakeholders, 
heard from attendants, especially banks, that they are closing Somali MTO accounts due to 
pressures from the Office of the Comptroller of the Curre
government problem, Representative Smith’s staff agreed to work with Ellison’s office on 
the bill, and Smith became a co
the summer. President Obama signed the bill into la
The remittance report, Adeso and Oxfam were well
media outlets and the report led to solid news coverage the last quarter of 2013, earning 17 
 
including private banks and MTO representatives. Having 
ncy (OCC) and that it is a 
-sponsor. This helped push the bill through Congress over 
w in August 8, 2014. 




media hits tallied by OUS." (Final Remittances Report
ii. Getting the Treasury Department
money to their loved ones through formal and legal channels. OUS targeted the Treasury in 
this campaign spike and used social media to be the primary vehicle 
the diaspora in particular, and 
recent report by Oxfam, Hanging by a Thread
to take some modest but important steps to keep remitta
iii. Pressing Merchants Bank to keep Somali MTO accounts open
petition and utilized social media to inform the public audience
led events, panel discussions and individual tactics such a
affected by remittances cut off.
and industry associations representi
(compliance) and the industry as a whole through collective action. OUS has been in 
discussions with approximately 25 MTO officials including one at the CEO level, two global 
directors and 10 US executives. Bank representatives also attended the roundtable hosted 
by Rep. Smith in Seattle, WA suggested by OUS. 
Adeso has led outreach to the MTO Executives and contributed research conducted in 
Somalia. It also created an infographic
Separate from the spike, Adeso has also played a valuable role in liaising with MTO 
executives in Dubai. Overall, OUS strategies have contributed to developing 
network with key decision makers that can be utilized in further campaign in and outside 
of the remittances field. According to the Final Remittances Report, the average rating of 
contacts made in the remittances campaign is comparable to the over
 
, Feb. 2014). 
 to ensure that all Somali-Americans are able to send 
for engaging people, 
to take actions directed at the Treasury.  According to the 
 (2015), such pressure led the US government 
nces flowing to Somalia. 
. The spike involved a 
. It also involved 
s the film on US of Somali families 
  OUS has also engaged with senior officials within the MTOs 
ng them on how to strengthen their business practices 
 
 and disseminated information through its networks. 
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government affairs contacts during FY13 Q2. The following table was tallies by OUS in the 
final report:  
 




The role of the diaspora was very crucial to obtaining traction and partial gains for 
the campaign. Diaspora engaged in many events the campaign organized as well as self-
organized some events. They called on elected leaders to enact policy, rallied and 
demonstrated directly in front of the Treasury office in St. Paul, MN and were effective. 
Diaspora was an important part of the campaign’s strategy and was committed to the issue, 
as it affects them and their families in such a direct and personal manner. 
The campaign identified members of the Somali diaspora who are highly respected 
and have expertise in organizing. Although it took some time to find the right individuals, 
the campaign made use of existing organizations such as the Service Employee 
International Union (SEIU), which regularly organizes workers such as janitors and taxi 
drivers in campaigns, connected Oxfam with Somalis in Minneapolis.  Additionally, the 
campaign work with Congressman Keith Ellison, who is one of two Muslim Congressmen, 
helped access wider Somali community in mosques such as Imams and influential 
community leaders.  
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Monitoring and Evaluation 
There were not any Monitoring and Evaluation plan in place during the 
campaign. In fact, as the campaign is still in process, there has not been any internal 
or external evaluation conducted to measure its success and impact. There are, 
however, two internal case studies: one 3-page case study conducted in March 2014 
and another 7-page case study completed in early February 2015. Both cases 
highlight OUS’s contributions to some of the changes in policy regarding 
remittances. They also highlight OUS’s development in terms of campaigning on 
remittances and gaining contacts and connections with the US government, Somali 
diaspora, Somali MTOs and US banks.  
Communication 
Oxfam has a set of principles, known as National Influencing Guidelines, to 
guide its influencing efforts in the countries in which they operate. These are 
principles regarding partnerships, namely working with civil society and social 
movements, working with governments, working with the private sector, gender 
guidelines on southern influencing, among others. For the purpose of this paper, only 
principles on working with governments will be assessed in the following table, 
since the campaign main target was a governmental institution, U.S. Department of 
Treasury.  
Oxfam realizes that governments vary considerably in their approach to 
executing their responsibilities towards their citizens. Hence, Oxfam employ, as per 
the relevant theory of change, various approaches to ensure support of people’s 
rights. The following table assesses the practices in the campaign against the 
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relevant principles; whether campaign practices complied with or deviated from 
those principles in the US context. 
Guideline Principles Assessment 
Oxfam does not get involved in the party politics 
of government. But Oxfam cares deeply about 
how those who are in power relate to people 
who are vulnerable and marginalised, our 
constituency. 
The campaign was non-partisan and worked with 
different major player to ensure the passage of the 
MRI act. Complying with this principle has helped to 
the MRI act passage in a congress that is very 
divided, with no opposition. 
Oxfam is particularly interested in working with 
government in situations where policy or legal 
change and/or improved implementation would 
benefit large numbers of people living in 
poverty. 
This principle was at the core of the campaign. OUS’s 
involvement was in response to requests by Somali 
local organizations. The report OUS commissioned 
showed that at least 40% of the Somali economy will 
be impacted in case of remittances disruption. OUS’s 
mission is to fight poverty, hunger and injustice. This 
principle has been completely complied with.  
Oxfam’s multiple methods of engaging and/or 
working directly with government are adjusted 
according to local circumstances. Decisions 
about how to best work with each government 
are made on a case-by-case basis, considering 
local factors. 
This principle is typical of campaigns. It’s been 
followed by the campaign team when identifying 
most influential decision makers and best practices 
to influence them.  
Oxfam may provide support to partners working 
with government, or, in some cases, even directly 
to Government units themselves. 
N/A 
While fully supporting government to discharge 
its rights responsibilities, Oxfam also seeks to 
maintain a degree of separation from 
government in order to preserve the 
independence of our work. 
OUS complied with this principle since no 
government influence on their work was identified. 
Oxfam may play convening roles to assist 
government to work more effectively with other 
parties, such as academia, civil society, people’s 
organisations, unions, faith-based organisations, 
and the private sector. 
OUS fully complied with this principle as some of the 
influencing tactics included convening government 
officials (Treasury, Congress and USAID) with private 
sector and civil society. One example is the 
roundtable that OUS organized in Seattle with 
Congressman Smith’s staff, bank and MTO 




Oxfam may have a linking function to help 
national governments engage more productively 
with regional and international bodies. 
OUS influencing included urging Treasury and State 
Department to support the Somali Central bank. This 
principle has been followed in the campaign by 
linking US Government with the Somali Government. 
When Oxfam works on national advocacy efforts 
directed at government, Oxfam seeks to 
strengthen our national-level partners and to 
give them more prominence. 
If we apply this principle on OUS relationship with 
it’s sole ally, we would find a deviation from the 
principle. Adeso didn’t gain prominence or publicity 
as OUS reputation and organization of events 
prevailed. According to an internal case study Adeso 
was “barely mentioned at the Hill launch event 
because it did not directly support the event, even 
though it was noted as a sponsor of the paper… The 
effect of this decision was to further minimize the 
Adeso partnership and Adeso’s role.”  
Oxfam applies the same high levels of financial 
accountability for our government partners that 




Assessment of Campaign Communication 
According to the Humanitarian Communication Officer, OUS Communication 
Department tried to show how remittances affect the daily life of Somalis in such a 
concrete way that US citizens could understand. In order to capture the extent to 
which OUS communication was effective, it will be gauged against a framework 
developed by the Center for Story-based Strategy (2013), known as F.R.A.M.E.S. 
Framing the Issue 
OUS and Adeso conveyed the issue of remittance disruption to Somalia from 
a humanitarian lens. OUS mission is to fight poverty, hunger, and injustice around 
the world. Similarly, Adeso’s mission is to create the atmosphere for Africans to 
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thrive. Hence, the frame focused on capturing the humanitarian impacts that 
disruption of remittance would cause. This is clear from their communication tactics 
such as the video, research, blog posts, among others. The general message was: 
Remittances cut-off is a cut of Somalis lifeline. 
Reframe Opponent’s Story & Reinforce Our Frame 
The campaign did a great effort to reframe the image of Somalia from a risky 
destination for the flow of remittances to a country recovering form being a failed 
state. This is conspicuous in providing evidence that remittance money is spent on 
basic needs and services such as food health and education. Additionally, the 
campaign emphasized the humanitarian aspect and the importance of remittances 
to the 40% of Somalis and the fact that remittances constitute one third of the 
Somali economy. Therefore, the issue was reframed from preventing terrorism and 
money laundering to preventing people from going hungry. Perhaps, one aspect that 
could be stressed further is the financial inclusion prospective. This aspect could 
have engaged more stakeholders and, more importantly, garnered more supporters. 
Accessible to the Audience 
The Somalia remittances campaign was indeed one of the most accessible to 
the main audience. It was not hard, according to interviewees, to engage the 
diaspora in an issue that directly affects them. Diaspora (see section on strategy) 
organized some events and attended most of the events organized by the campaign. 
An area of improvement might be encouraging all diaspora to invite some of their 
fellow Americans to take part in events and actions directed at campaign targets. 
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This will make the campaign supporters expand beyond diaspora and Somali 
workers.  
Meme 
A meme means that messaging and communications should be something 
accessible, relatable, and memorable for the main audience. Creating an image in the 
minds of audience is a powerful tool to get their support. The campaign has a superb 
meme: Keep the Lifeline Open for Somalia. It conjures up an imagery that remittances 
is a lifeline; rather the heartbeat of Somalia and, should it be cut, Somalis will be 
lifeless, dependent, and poverty-stricken. 
Emotions 
The campaign communication was not only intellectual and commonsensical, 
but above all emotional. It appealed to the emotions and values of the audience and 
helped trigger an emotional response that led to taking actions. Anyone would feel 
upset at US regulations when watching the video or reading the infographic, both 
showing the suffering that Somalis would go through if remittances are disrupted.  
Simple and Short 
Regardless of the complications of US AML/CFT regulations, the fact is that 
people’s life is at the bottom of the story. The campaign paid a considerable focus to 
this human story and amplified it, and made as simple as possible. At least 40% (4 
million) Somalis would be hugely affected by the remittance disruption. The 
campaign team utilized the powerful story and made it a moral and legal 
responsibility on the part of the US administration, Treasury and Congress to ensure 
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formal channels for the flow of remittances to Somalia from its diaspora in the 
States. 
Effectiveness, Outcomes and Contribution 
In policy advocacy, attribution of contribution becomes a difficult task. A fair 
evaluation of the campaign, however, would feature remarkable contributions from 
OUS involvement in the campaign to the campaign outcomes.  OUS took on a 
courageous decision to get involved in a campaign they had no time to prepare for. 
The humanitarian team then solicited support from other teams, such as 
Government Affairs, Private Sector, Organizing and Alliances, Media, and Research 
teams. It is also important to note that OUS has no prior experience in remittances 
when they worked on this campaign. By taking on the remittances issue, OUS 
became the only US INGO to work on remittances. 
Oxfam had three periods of intense campaigning, or ‘campaign spikes,’ a) 
support passage of the Money Remittances Improvement Act and b) Pressure US 
Department of State and Department of Treasury to change bank regulations and 
work with the Somali Central Bank to strengthen the bank’s financial system, and c) 
convince Merchants Bank to reverse its decision to close Somali MTO accounts. One 
campaign spike, from December 2011 to April 2014, culminated in the signing of 
Money Remittances Improvement Act into law by President Obama in April 2014. 
The second campaign succeeded in pressuring the Department of State and 
Department of Treasury to take some steps towards ensuring the flow of 
remittances into Somalia. The third spike, in May 2014, focused on Merchant’s Bank 
and was ultimately unsuccessful.  
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According to a recent Oxfam publication, Hanging by a Thread (2015), OUS 
influencing work directed at the US government further have helped pressure 
government actions towards improving remittances into Somalia over the past 
three years. These actions include important steps to strengthen Somalia’s financial 
system. This is reflected in the formation of a National Security Council-led 
interagency working group on remittances to Somalia, which demonstrates that the 
government has come to appreciate the consequences of a disruption in remittance 
flows. The U.S. Department of Treasury and USAID have worked together with the 
Central Bank of Somalia to help improve its public financial management system, 
setting the ground for the Central Bank of Somalia to become financially self-
sufficient. In order to be able to connect with the international financial network, 
the Treasury Department is helping the Central Bank of Somalia to build its 
supervision unit. However, the most promising step of all was the Treasury's 
commitment in September 2014 to set clear expectations for banks dealing with 
high-risk MTOs. This commitment is seen, according to OUS recent research, as a 
promise that reflects real political commitment "to addressing the systemic 
challenges facing the most difficult-to serve money transfer corridors" (Hanging by 
a Thread, 2015). 
  OUS’s third campaign spike targeted at Merchants Bank decision to close 
Somali MTO accounts was successful in temporarily reprieving Merchants decision 
for six months. The campaign spike involved a petition, a day of international twitter 
action, a couple of diaspora-led events including a rally and another public panel as 
well as media and lobbying work.  Individual tactics were very effective, such as a 
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video featuring Somali-Americans that highlighted how Somali families would be 
affected if remittances are disrupted. Despite these efforts, Merchants Bank went 
ahead with the account closures on February 6, 2015. In multi-stakeholder 
campaigns such setbacks are normal. On the positive side of this spike, OUS gained 
specific strategies on influencing financial institutions and won a six-month period 
of time in which they kept working on influencing other targets. 
OUS’s work on remittances also built OUS’s own capacity to do effective 
policy work in this area. It strengthened Oxfam’s relationships with the US Somali 
diaspora community and raised Oxfam America’s profile on remittances in the US, 
being the only international NGO conducting remittance advocacy in the US. It 
demonstrated Oxfam’s ability to play a convening role between governments, the 
diaspora, and the private sector on this issue.  
Lessons Learned 
There is so much that can be learned from the campaign and from writing a 
case study on it. Writing this case study has been a very rewarding learning 
experience. I have conducted 8 interviews with a number of stakeholders including 
OUS staff, a member of each of OUS in-country staff, Adeso, Rep. Smith’s staff, Global 
Center on Cooperative Security, and Somali diaspora. Some of the interviews were 
followed up with few questions to be clarified via emails. I audio-taped all 
interviews and transcribed some of them. I was also taking quick notes of the most 
important points discussed. I gained more confidence with every interview I did. I 
noticed an improvement in my interviewing skills in terms of type and clarity of 
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questions asked; follow up questions, notes taking, and following up with 
interviewees. 
This case study is special. It is the only case where two policy experts were 
revising it, Gabrielle Watson and Jeff Unsicker. It seemed that I was under a 
showering of questions every time the draft was sent to them for review. It turned 
out that those questions were helping me understand more about the campaign. It 
was not by any means meant to make it difficult for me. In fact, that helped me not 
only feel accomplished about my efforts on this case, but also helped me develop a 
critical lens when writing the longer case study. I always asked myself similar 
questions that were posed to me for the shorter case, which helped me further 
analyze and better understand the campaign. 
Lessons learned from the campaign are many. In terms of policy advocacy, 
this case is rich with lessons. But to me, a few lessons stand out. I learned that 
putting a human face or story on the campaign is very crucial to gain media 
coverage and influence targets. OUS was able to garner national and international 
media and engage digital audience via social media by virtue of the human side of 
the campaign. I think Merchants bank was also influenced to a certain extent by the 
story, especially the video and research results. That is why they postponed their 
decision to close Somali MTO bank accounts for six months. In addition, showing 
evidence based research results along with the human story is a powerful tool to 
influence government, State Department, and USAID in particular. The results 
clearly indicate that the crux of the issue lies within the US banking regulations and 
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portrays a sense of urgency to take actions to help remittances flow smoothly 
without any disruption. 
In the wake of the February 6th account closures by Merchants Bank, it 
becomes apparent that getting the Money Remittances Improvement Act, while a 
positive step, was not sufficient to keep remittance flows open. The Act did not stop 
the private bank decision to close MTO bank accounts. It also has not facilitated the 
ability and capacity of nonbank financial institutions, such as money service 
business, to remit money internationally. So, an act passed by the Government does 
not necessarily mean solving the problem.  
It is possible to develop the space to work on an issue at the request of 
partner organizations and find internal support for it, even if a specific issue is not 
an OUS priority, is initially perceived as risky. The humanitarian team was able to 
successfully solicit support and staff time from the Government Affairs, Private 
Sector, Organizing and Alliances, Media, and Research teams, even though 
remittances are not an agency priority.  
The portrayal of partner organizations is crucial at external events. Adeso 
was barely mentioned at the Capitol Hill launch event because it did not directly 
support the event, even though it was noted as a sponsor of the paper. OUS also 
decided not to read the Somali Prime Minister and researcher’s written statements 
because of a general sense that it would not be appropriate to read written 
statements aloud. The effect of this decision was to further minimize the Adeso 
partnership and Adeso’s role. Better communication about Adeso’s role in the event 
during the planning process would have fostered a better relationship. In order for 
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OUS practice to match its rhetoric and desire to form Southern-based NGO partners, 
communication and collaboration with Southern-based NGOs needs to encompass 
all phases of the project and the nature of the relationship needs to be 
communicated clearly to other stakeholders in the organization.  
It is necessary to thoroughly explain a partnership and previous work that 
originated in collaboration with one affiliate to other affiliates as the partnership 
expands. The Adeso-OUS partnership was originally confined to a single affiliate, 
which then expanded to include OGB. The links with the country team were limited 
mainly because of a change of staff over a key period of drafting the report. This 
meant the Oxfam in Somalia team did not give adequate input into either the report 
or the relationship with Adeso, which would have helped to strengthen the 
partnership at the outset.  
In an attempt to improve work with diaspora, OUS Senior Humanitarian 
Advisor recommends conducting a thorough research of diaspora and talk to lots of 
people to ensure they have the necessary networks and skills to be more effective 
partners. OUS Humanitarian Advisor stressed the importance of listening to what 
the diaspora care about in order to build a long-term trust and relationship.  
One good practice that the campaign team learned that came out of the early 
outreach meeting in the summer of 2013 is to share reports with stakeholders to get 
their input before the final publication. Scott Paul sent copies of the draft report to 
some participants before an event in Seattle and sought feedback. The feedback was 
helpful as Scott was updating the report. For the new report that will be launched in 
SOMALIA MONEY REMITTANCES 
 
44
mid February 2015, Scott sent a draft of the report to be shared with communities in 
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Cargill, Land and Power in Colombia, A WIN Case Study.
WIN CASE STUDY
Cargill, Land and Power in 
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One of the central themes of the Oxfam GROW Campaign is access to land, ways of acquiring it, 
and practices involving land concentration and monopolization. Land is a topic of interest for 
GROW in Colombia, as the increasing concentration of this resource constitutes a threat to 
small-scale agriculture and food production, and also reproduces and perpetuates the high 
levels of poverty and inequality prevalent in the country. Concentration of land ownership is 
also recognized as one of the main causes of the armed conflict in the country, and is thus one 
of the central issues of the current peace talks taking place between the Colombian government 
and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group. 
 
As part of the GROW campaign, Oxfam in Colombia along with Oxfam Great Britain (OGB), 
Oxfam Intermón (OES), Oxfam America (OUS) and allied national organizations in Colombia 
worked together to stop a bill the Colombian government was preparing to present to Congress. 
The bill was designed to facilitate and legalize large-scale concentration of land intended for 
small farmers. Oxfam contributed to an informed debate in Colombia on rural development, 
equitable access to land, and protection of the rights of small farmers and supported small 
farmers’ organizations by publishing a rigorous study that backed their proposals and demands. 
and thus strengthened their ability to get their voices heard. Oxfam had three major outcomes: 
1) the high public profile of a research report, Divide and Purchase, prepared by Oxfam in 
Colombia; 2) the wide dissemination and coverage of the case by the media; and 3) the 
government’s commitment to not only withdraw the bill but also to not submit it again. 
 
What was the goal? 
Given the interests of the GROW Campaign, the political situation in Colombia, and the 
evolution of the research, four goals were defined for the campaign spike: 
1. To contribute to an informed debate in Colombia on rural development, equitable 
access to land, and protection of the rights of small farmers.  
2. To draw the attention of the government (the legislative and executive branches, 
Congress, and control bodies) to the need to establish effective regulations on large-
scale purchases of land. 
3. To exercise pressure to prevent reforms that legalize practices such as those of Cargill.  
4. To support small farmers’ organizations by publishing rigorous studies that back their 
proposals and demands, and thus strengthen their ability to get their voices heard.  
 
What was the result? 
There are three results that stand out in this case. The first is the success of a global research 
report, Divide and Purchase, by Oxfam in Colombia. The report was on a Colombian economic 
justice issue that has regional and global implications - the undue concentration and 
accumulation of land, a theme prioritized in the global GROW campaign. The report was used as 
part of the global campaign, which was a first for Oxfam in Colombia. The second result is the 
broad dissemination and coverage of the report in the media, which is a result of its quality, 
relevance to the current Colombian situation, and the highly effective work carried out with the 
media and social networks. The success of the report’s launch reflects recognition of Oxfam and 
its convening power in Colombia, as well as the organization’s ability to analyze and make best 
use of the current Colombian situation. Oxfam in Colombia worked with key allies throughout, 
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including discussion of initial research findings and involvement in the report launch. The results 
of the launch also demonstrate Oxfam’s skill in positioning itself, building its profile and creating 
openings for civil society with a good research report. It further  created a forum for discussion 
in which the opinions of all parties could be voiced (state regulatory agencies, Congress, private 
sector, and small farmers' organizations). The last result is that the government not only 
withdrew the bill, but also did not submit it again.   
 
How was change achieved? 
As part of the GROW campaign, OUS included the identification of and research on possible land 
grabbing cases involving US investors. In 2012, OUS contacted and financed Oxfam in Colombia 
to conduct an exploratory study. The work to develop, publish and launch the report was carried 
out jointly by OUS and Oxfam in Colombia, and the launch activities in 2013 and follow up in 
Colombia were done by Oxfam in Colombia with support from OGB in LAC (Latin America and 
the Caribbean).  
 
After completing the initial research, there were requests from allies in Colombia to quickly 
reveal the findings of the study. Colombian member of Congress Wilson Arias made a formal 
request to Oxfam to present its findings. After consultation and agreement with allied national 
organizations, Oxfam decided to present the initial results in a closed meeting in June 2013 with 
media, opinion makers, members of Congress and allies. The preliminary results were published 
in the media, including in Time Magazine. This caused a multiplier effect in the Colombian 
national media, which fueled a scandal that had already erupted involving Colombia’s 
Ambassador to the US, whose law firm had brokered the irregular land acquisitions by Cargill 
and other companies. OUS and Oxfam in Colombia decided to publish an Oxfam report using the 
research results, and OUS contacted Cargill about it, resulting in several meetings in which it was 
agreed to submit the report to the company for review and respond well in advance of 
publication. After receiving the report, Cargill initiated further dialogues with Oxfam: with OUS 
and OGB at the highest level (Executive Directors); in Bogotá with the country team; and in 
several other conversations with OUS. In most of these meetings, Cargill asked Oxfam, either 
directly or indirectly, to not publish the report. The report was launched in September 2013 in 
Colombia at an event with members of the media, government entities and NGOs.  
 
The report launch drew further attention to the scandal in Colombia on the irregular acquisition 
and accumulation of land (baldíos) in the Altillanura region by Cargill and others, giving an 
important boost to work by Oxfam and allies in Colombia to halt the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
initiative seeking to legalize such practices. The baldíos are lands which, under the Constitution, 
should be given to landless small farmers, yet the reforms to the law would enable companies to 
accumulate them, leading to further concentration of land holdings. Oxfam’s report and work 
with allies brought greater attention to the issue and raised opposition to the idea of such 
reforms.  
Oxfam in Colombia brought together a broad group of allies to jointly hold a press conference in 
November 2013, which was widely covered by the media (17 national and 24 international 
media hits) and trended on social media as the most popular issue tweeted in Colombia the 
morning of the launch. A few days later the Ministry submitted a bill to Congress, but the 
Cabinet head ordered it withdrawn so as to revise and resubmit it. Following the launch, Oxfam 
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convened a broad group of stakeholders, including some non-traditional allies, to speak out 
jointly against the new law that was about to be introduced. Members of Congress also spoke 
out and presented their own evidence against the law. Oxfam’s convening power and elevation 
of the issue’s profile enabled allies to have more impact and pushed government oversight 
entities to pay more attention to the problem of undue concentration of landholdings through 
acquisition of baldíos. This way, Oxfam and allies kept up the pressure in Colombia against the 
proposed reforms.  
The issue was raised at the negotiating table between the government and the FARC. The high 
profile of the issue brought it to the attention of the intermediator in the peace negotiations 
between the Colombian government and the FARC. Oxfam’s report had already pointed out that 
Cargill’s actions and any legislation that would make these actions legal would be incoherent 
with agreements reached at the negotiating table. Intervention by the intermediator pushed the 
government to commit to not reintroduce the bill to reform the sale and acquisition of baldíos. 
In addition, a ruling by the Superintendencia de Sociedades (corporations superintendency) 
ordered the multinational Monica Semillas to return money from state subsidies awarded to 
shell companies that were set up by the multinational in order to break up land purchases. The 
ruling sets a precedent which will discourage private enterprises from using corporate 
mechanisms to circumvent the law. 
What were the key lessons learned? 
Good research on a topic that is nationally relevant and well-timed can raise an issue’s profile in 
country, galvanize and support allies and have an impact on policy outcomes. Keys to success 
are  robust research and the country team’s willingness to use its convening power with allies 
and other stakeholders to follow through with advocacy. Sometimes it can be helpful for Oxfam 
to take a highly visible, public stance and put its own research and positions forward in support 
of allies and a policy agenda shared with allies.  
 
It is important to assess the external context in country and not just the interest to Oxfam with 
regard to the initiative and to ensure joint ownership between country team and affiliate or 
global team from the outset. The timeline should be set by the country team and flexibility to 
accommodate opportunities should be allowed. The case was identified knowing the context in 
Colombia and understanding that research findings could reveal information relevant to the 
situation in the country as it was evolving. The concept was discussed jointly by OUS and the 
Oxfam GROW team in Colombia as well as the Country Leadership Team, and the research was 
of mutual interest to all involved. OUS and Oxfam in Colombia agreed to joint ownership of the 
research and the process.  
 
It is important to know and follow all affiliate, regional and private sector procedures for review, 
sign-off risk and assessment from the beginning, and ensure close and regular communication in 
the small core team, so that if questions or concerns arise from affiliate management at any 
level, they can be easily addressed. The overall support by the three affiliates for publishing the 
report despite requests and pressure from Cargill was important for the country team.  
 
It is important to assess synergies between national and international media coverage, which 
might be different for different countries. In this case, coverage by one international outlet 
spurred more extensive national coverage, which in turn spurred more international media 
SOMALIA MONEY REMITTANCES 
 
51
interest. Some national media outlets initially indicated the issue was too sensitive for them to 





Finally, it is important to consider the potential for regional relevance of national influencing 
work, since reports can also be useful for the influencing agendas in other countries of the 
region even when there is no regional advocacy target for the issue. Country influencing 
opportunities can spur regional interest and might generate unintended effects in other 
countries, so it is worth including some regional planning around national launches. At 
minimum, other countries in the region should be informed from the preparatory stage of the 



































Somali Remittances Campaign, WIN Case Study.
WIN CASE STUDY
Somalia Remittances: Keeping the Lifeline Open
Summary 
In December 2011, Oxfam America (OUS) began working on the issue of remittances to Somalia 
at the request of Somali partner organizations that 
Transfer Operator (MTO) accounts by US banks.
Development Solutions (Adeso), a humanitarian and development NGO with a long history of 
working in Somalia. This work succeed
Improvement Act in April 2014. The subsequent campaign spike succeeded in delaying 
Merchants Bank decision to close Somali MTO bank accounts for six months, which on February 
6th of this year decided to close the Somali MTO accounts. On a process outcome standpoint, 
OUS’s work on the issue is significant because it was originally taken up at the request of the 
Somali partner organizations and allowed Oxfam to 
diaspora and raising OUS’s profile on remittances in the US
international NGO conducting remittance advocacy in the US. It also 
of OUS to play a convening role between governments, the diaspora, a
this issue. 






were alarmed by the closing of Money 
 Oxfam’s main partner for this work was African 
ed in supporting the passage of the Money Remittance 
strengthen relationships with the US Somali 
, especially because OUS is 
demonstrated the capacity 











Remittances to Somalia amount to approximately $1.3 billion a year, 16
the United States, an amount comparable to US humanitarian assistance to Somalia ($242 
million) in 2012. Remittances are a lifeline for many Somalis, providing them with a means to 
meet their immediate needs for food, shelter, clothing,
open and sustain small businesses, send children to school, and invest in their communities. 
Over 40% of Somalis depend on money sent by relatives abroad and, due to this imminent 
remittance disruption, over 56 thous
be unable to support their families back home. Furthermore, this remittance cut
destabilize communities, empower criminal groups, and deprive families of the support they 
need to survive and thrive. 
 
Somali-American Money Transfer Operator
and have made significant strides toward reducing risk through monitoring, record keeping, and 
agent training. Still, the Somalia remittance pipeline
efforts, Somali-American MTOs are often perceived as representing a high risk for illegal 
activities, such as the financing of groups and individuals listed by the US government as 
terrorists. Many banks closed MTO a
operations, disrupted remittances from the US to Somalia, and, in particular, jeopardiz
survival of Somali families during the 2011 famine. 
organizations as further bank account closures could result in a total remittance cutoff, which 
would endanger more Somali lives and interrupt economic development in the country as a 
whole. Partner organizations requested OUS to use it advocacy capacity to influence decisio
makers in the US. OUS believes that i
government, US banks, and Somali
these disruptions and greatly enhance the security of the remittance syste
 
What was the goal? 
For this campaign and Merchants campaign 
1. Push the US Government to prioritize remittances to Somalia
preventing a significant disruption in the flow of money to Somalia through 
emergency measures.
2. Through direct communication and media work, convince Merchants Bank to 
reverse its decision to close Somali MTO accounts.
 
What was the result? 
One campaign spike culminated in the signing of Money Remittances Improvement Act into law 
by President Obama in April 2014. When Representative Ellison (D
OUS worked in his district to mobilize the diaspora to create a positive incentive for him to 
continue to lead on the issue. When 
Smith (D-WA) got interested and wanted to learn more on the issue. 
 
% of which comes from 
 and other basic necessities as well as 
and Somali-Americans and Somali migrant workers would 
-off is likely to 
s (MTOs) actively seek to comply with US regulations 
 is under serious threat. Despite their 
ccounts, which made it difficult for MTOs to maintain 
This sent an alarm to Somali partner 
f all the stakeholders—the Somali authorities, the US 
-American MTOs—make a concerted effort, they can prevent 
m.  





Ellison’s bill started moving in congress, Representative






 the bill, 
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to hold a round table of multiple stakeholders including private banks and MTO representatives. 
Representative Smith’s staff agreed to work with Ellison on the bill and Smith became a co-
sponsor of the bill, which helped push the bill through Congress on the summer and became law 
on April of 2014.  
 
The bill would "allow the Treasury secretary to use state examinations for certain financial 
institutions instead of federal reporting requirements." This means a streamline in the 
remittances process; making it easy for the diaspora to send money to loved ones in Somalia. 
The bill would also make it easier for nonbank financial institutions such as money service 
businesses to provide remittance payments internationally.  In the words of Representative 
Ellison (D-MN) the “Passage of the Money Remittances Improvement Act is cause for 
celebration for all diaspora communities, including the Somali and Hmong communities I am 
proud to represent in Minnesota.”  
 
OUS influencing work directed at the US government further helped pressure government 
actions towards improving remittances into Somali. The recent Oxfam publication, Hanging by a 
Thread, mentions that the US government has taken some modest but important steps to help 
put Somalia on a stronger financial footing. This is reflected in the formation of a National 
Security Council-led interagency working group on remittances to Somalia, which demonstrates 
that the government has come to appreciate the consequences of a disruption in remittance 
flows. The Treasury and USAID have collaborated with the Central Bank of Somalia to help 
improve its public financial management system, paving the way to become financially self-
sufficient. The Treasury is helping the Central Bank build its supervision unit, a much-needed 
capacity for any country that aims to connect to international financial networks. But most 
promising is the Treasury September 2014 promise to clarify expectations for banks dealing with 
high-risk MTOs; a promise which reflects real political commitment to addressing the systemic 
challenges facing the most difficult-to serve money transfer corridors. 
 
Oxfam’s work succeeded in strengthening relationships with the US Somali diaspora and raising 
Oxfam America’s profile on remittances in the US. It also highlighted the potential for OUS to 
play a convening role between governments, the diaspora, and the private sector on this issue. 
OUS’s work on the issue is significant because it was originally taken up at the request of Somali 
partner organizations and allowed Oxfam to develop solid relations with the Somali government 
and diaspora. Although other NGOs are working on remittances within Somalia, Oxfam is the 
only international NGO conducting remittance advocacy in the US. 
OUS’s subsequent campaign spike targeted at Merchants Bank decision to close Somali MTO 
accounts was successful in temporarily reprieving Merchants decision for six months. The 
campaign spike involved a petition, a day of international twitter action, a couple of diaspora led 
events including a rally and another public panel as well as media and lobbying work.  Individual 
tactics came off very well such as the film that was prepared mainly in the US of Somali families 
affected by remittances cut off. 
Until recently, Somali MTOs have been hugely reliant on a single bank, Merchants Bank of 
California, to transfer funds abroad. Although OUS succeeded in delaying Merchants decision for 
about six months, due to pressure from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Merchants Bank announced on January 27th, 2015, that it would terminate all of its Somali MTO 
accounts on February 6th. This is a trend within the banking sector known as de-risking—
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avoiding high financial and reputational risks of violating Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and 
Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regulations. Consequently, many Somali MTOs, 
including the largest by volume and coverage, are planning to discontinue money transfers if the 
account closures move forward as planned. While it is difficult to assess how much money 
Somali-Americans will be able to send following the account closures, between $200m-
$400m/year could be at stake.  MTOs could manage to continue their business based on a, for 
example in the UK, wholesale MTOs who have existing accounts that MTOs with no accounts 
can transfer money through. This is a vulnerable process as banks can still pressure those 
wholesale MTOs to end business with MTOs with no accounts. Other means leaves diaspora 
with illegal channels of transfer with no official oversight, usually costly and puts the sender’s 
(diaspora) money at risk of fraud. 
How was change achieved? 
[Add a paragraph that presents the overarching timeline or phases of the work, and influencing 
strategies for each phase. (Who were the targets, what was the change being sought, and how 
did we hope to achieve it?) For example, there was a phase of awareness-raising, a phase to 
support passage of the Remittance bill, another phase to influence Merchants’ bank, and there 
was also work with treasury. You need to show how tactics and activities described here (and 
evidence of their effectiveness) helped advance specific influencing strategies. Why did they do 
the different activities? Did they have the effect they wanted? It’s more interesting to know the 
result of the tactics than the counts of how many media hits or participants at events. ]   
When OUS was requested to work on the remittances issue by partner organizations, OUS 
tasked its Senior Humanitarian Policy Advisor with exploring the possibilities to get involved in 
the issue. OUS then commissioned further research to gain a comprehensive understanding of 
remittances to Somalia and possible solutions resulting in the research report “Keeping the 
Lifeline Open” in June 2013. OUS influencing work helped support the passage of the Money 
Remittances Improvement Act of April 2014 co-sponsored by Rep Ellison (D-MN) and Rep. Smith 
(D-WA). OUS also targeted the Treasury with influencing work. Social media turned out to be the 
primary vehicle for engaging people, the diaspora in particular, to take actions directed at the 
Treasury.  According to the recent report by Oxfam, Hanging by a Thread, such pressure lead the 
US government to take some modest but important steps help put Somali on a stronger 
financial footing. OUS conducted a subsequent campaign spike targeted at Merchants bank 
decision to close Somali MTO accounts in May 2014. The spike involved a petition, utilized social 
media to inform the public audience, diaspora led events, panel discussions and individual 
tactics such as the film on US of Somali families affected by remittances cut off. 
OUS Senior Humanitarian Policy Advisor Scott Paul travelled to Minnesota in May and 
Somaliland in August 2012 to explore the root causes of the problem and potential for Oxfam 
involvement. OUS then commissioned further research to gain a comprehensive picture of the 
remittance issue and possible solutions culminating in the research report “Keeping the Lifeline 
Open” in June 2013, which was co-branded with Adeso and Inter-American Dialogue, the 
organization that conducted the research. The research aimed at providing evidence to how 
remittances are crucial for Somali life, livelihood, and Somali economy and made clear 
recommendations for US government, agencies, private banks, and MTOs. The report release 
was accompanied by launch events in Washington, DC, Seattle, Minneapolis, Nairobi and the 
UK. The report was widely distributed (OUS distributed 600 report copies and Adeso few 
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hundred) and via email, including to key targets, including government officials, State 
Department and USAID officers. 
 
 
Scott Paul wrote four remittance blogs on Oxfam’s blog page, which had a combined 908 unique 
page views and 360 shares during this period. Oxfam also hosted one event in Seattle and spoke 
at two events in Minneapolis that were attended by members of the Somali Diaspora, 
congressional staffers, Somali imams, community leaders and Representative. After the event in 
Seattle, Jonathon Scanlon, Oxfam’s Senior Alliances Advisor, convinced Representative Adam 
Smith (D-WA) staff to host a multi-stakeholder roundtable in which Oxfam participated. As a 
result, Rep. Smith agreed to work with Ellison office on the remittance bill and became a co-
sponsor of the bill. 
OUS engaged directly with executives from three target banks—Sunrise, US Bank and Wells 
Fargo. OUS has also engaged with senior officials within the MTOs and industry associations 
representing them on how to strengthen their business practices (compliance) and the industry 
as a whole through collective action. OUS has been in discussions with approximately 25 MTO 
officials including one at the CEO level, two global directors, 12 UK executives and 10 US 
executives. Bank representatives attended the roundtable hosted by Rep. Smith in Seattle, WA.  
The report positioned OI and OGB to lead on the issue in the UK, where Oxfam received 
extensive media coverage for its work. A full link to all international media coverage on 
remittances, including coverage outside the timeframe of this report can be found 
here:https://sumus.oxfam.org/node/135140. The amount of positive local media coverage that 
remittances generated was surprising. The ability to send remittances affects the diaspora on a 
daily basis, and there are many great personal stories within the diaspora that highlights the 
importance of remittances. It is easier to engage the diaspora on an issue that directly affects 
them, and the report was a valuable tool for outreach. 
Adeso has led outreach to the MTO Executives and contributed research conducted in Somalia. 
It also created an infographic and disseminated information through its networks. Separate 
from the spike, Adeso has also played a valuable role in liaising with MTO executives in Dubai.  
 
What were the key lessons learned? 
Lessons learned in this campaign and its subsequent spikes are drawn from interviews with 
campaign staff, allies and partners and internal documents. 
 
In the wake of the recent development in the issue of remittances with the MTO account 
closures by Merchants on February 6th, it becomes apparent that getting a law passed is one 
thing, but getting it implemented and its impact to be reflected on the affected population is 
another. The Money Remittances Improvement Act seems to have little to no influence on 
private bank decisions to disrupt remittances by closing MTO bank accounts. It also has not 
facilitated the ability and capacity of nonbank financial institutions, such as money service 
business, to remit money internationally. 
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It is possible to develop the space to work on an issue at the request of partner organizations 
and find internal support for it, even if a specific issue is not an Oxfam America priority, is 
initially perceived as risky, or does not neatly sit within established work. The humanitarian 
team was successfully able to solicit support and staff time from the Government Affairs, Private 
Sector, Organizing and Alliances, Media, and Research teams, even though remittances is not an 
agency priority.  
 
The portrayal of partner organizations is crucial at external events. Adeso was barely mentioned 
at the Hill launch event because it did not directly support the event, even though it was noted 
as a sponsor of the paper. OUS also decided not to read the Somali Prime Minister’s and 
researcher’s written statements because of a general sense that it would not be appropriate to 
read written statements aloud. The effect of this decision was to further minimize the Adeso 
partnership and Adeso’s role. Better communication about Adeso’s role in the event during the 
planning process would have fostered a better relationship. In order for OUS practice to match 
its rhetoric and desire to form Southern-based NGO partners, communication and collaboration 
with Southern-based NGOs needs to encompass all phases of the project and the nature of the 
relationship needs to be communicated clearly to other stakeholders in the organization.  
 
It is necessary to thoroughly explain a partnership and previous work that originated in 
collaboration with one affiliate to other affiliates as the partnership expands. The Adeso-OUS 
partnership was originally confined to a single affiliate, which then expanded to include OGB. 
The links with the country team were limited mainly because of a change of staff over a key 
period of drafting the report. This meant the Oxfam in Somalia team did not give adequate input 
into either the report or the relationship with Adeso, which would have helped to strengthen 
the partnership at the outset.  
 
One good practice that the campaign team learned that came out of the early outreach meeting 
in the summer of 2013 is to share reports with stakeholders to get their input before the final 
publication. Scott Paul sent copies of the draft report to some participants before an event in 
Seattle and sought feedback. The feedback was helpful as Scott was updating the report. For the 
new report that will be launched in mid February 2015, Scott sent a draft of the report to be 



















PROTOCOL for CASE STUDY SELF-ASSESSMENTS of NATIONAL LEVEL 
POLICY INFLUENCING CAMPAIGNS and INITIATIVES (Protocol sections 
only) 
A case study of a policy influencing intervention will typically be a 20-40 page written 
document, plus a short executive summary and an appendix containing relevant documents 
(campaign plans, reports, campaign communications, examples of media coverage, etc.) and 
list of sources (interviews, documents, literature, etc.) 
 







Brief overview of the campaign, including a timeline of events, and 
description of the case study research process 
Context Historical background and the major political, economic and social factors 
that influenced the advocacy but were beyond the advocates’ control 
Advocates Organizational capacity and resources 
 
Policy Problems that are being addressed, their causes, and the proposed changes 
in laws, regulations or other policies, including the evidence for each 
Politics 
 
Visible and hidden policy making process and actors; direct and indirect 
constituents; allies and internal champions; opponents  
Strategy Theory of change; combination and sequence of influencing methods 
(collaborative and/or confrontational) 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation Plans 
Plans (including indicators), if any, for monitoring and evaluations of 
process effectiveness, outcomes and impact    
Effectiveness Assessment of the degree to which campaign and M&E plans were 
effectively implemented/adjusted, including the various outputs, and 
factors that influenced effectiveness    
Outcomes 
 
Progress toward or changes (if any) in policy and in power – including 
changes in policy making processes, and capacity of civil society advocates 
to protect policy changes and/or push for more 
Contributions 
 
Process tracing analysis of  the causal factors behind outcomes and 
estimation of relative contribution of Oxfam and/or its partners 
Impact 
 
Actual or projected impact of the outcomes  
Lessons learned 
 
Insights about aspects of the campaign plan and implementation that 
resulted in success (or failure), with a focus on those that can inform future 
advocacy  
 
